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Abstract:   This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on 
building trust in a relationship. We have nested our explorations in the standard version 
of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee 
decides whether to give a gift to the trustor before both of them proceed to play the 
investment game. We observe that in such case the majority of trustees offer their 
endowment to trustors. Consequently, receiving a gift significantly increases the amounts 
sent by trustors when controlling for the differences in payoffs created by it. Trustees are, 
however, not better off by giving a gift as the increase in the amount sent by trustors is 
not large enough to offset the trustees’ loss associated with the cost of giving a gift. Our 
results indicate that a relationship which is initiated by gift giving leads to higher trust 
and efficiency but at the same time is probably not stable. 
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1 WORKING PAPER No. 11/2009  
 




   The majority, if not all, economic interactions rely on trust (Arrow (1974)). 
Whether it is a situation involving a hidden action or hidden information, the trusting 
party might get adversely affected if their counterpart decides to appropriate too much or 
the entire monetary surplus. Dasgupta (2000) states that: “Trust is important because its 
presence or absence can have a bearing on what we choose to do, and in many cases 
what we can do” (p.330). Recent years have seen an explosion of work on the importance 
of trust in economic transactions and for well-being (e.g., Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama 
(1995)), its applications and implications (e.g., Knack and Keefer (1997), La Porta, et al. 
(1997), Zak and Knack (2001), and Servátka, et al. (2008a)), as well as studies exploring 
mechanisms trying to foster trust and cooperation (e.g., Andreoni (2005), Andreoni and 
Samuelson (2006), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Ben-Ner, et. al. (2007), Bracht and 
Feltovich (2007), Servátka, et al. (2008b), and Ben-Ner and Putterman (forthcoming)). 
  At first glance, it might seem that increasing trust is desirable as it (often) 
improves economic efficiency. However, a significant fraction of defectors who betray 
trust exists in the world and thus trusting everyone is not an optimal strategy. The way to 
win trust is to make concessions and clearly explain how much these gifts cost.
1 In a nice 
experiment Andreoni and Samuelson (2006) find that cooperation is best achieved when 
the parties first cooperate in a small-stakes, low-temptation environment and then slowly 
evolve through a series of successful interactions into a large-stakes partnership.  It is as 
if giving a gift prior to a transaction created a reputation that might pay dividends in the 
future.
2 Servátka (2008, 2009) has made a similar argument with respect to generosity 
and Riedl and Seinen (2002) with respect to trust. 
                                                 
1 “Tips to build trust during negotiation” The New York Times Syndicate, Tuesday, January 06, 2009. 
2 If there exists a possibility for reputation building due to repeated interaction (Kreps, et al. (1982) and 
Kreps and Wilson (1982)) and/or if the contract between the transacting parties is verifiable and 
enforceable (Charness, et al. (2008)), the problem whether to trust or not is easily mitigated because the 
parties face severe punishments on the off-equilibrium path. A competition among trustees is observed to 
have even stronger effects than reputation building (Huck, et al. (2007)). 
2 In this paper we present an experiment which evaluates the effect of gift giving on 
the amount of trust in the investment game (Berg, et al. (1995)). A gift  is a binary 
decision of a trustee who can send either nothing or all of his $10 endowment to the 
trustor in a dictator game stage prior to playing the investment game. If a gift is given, 
then in a case of failed relationship  the trustor is at least as well off as if no transaction 
ever took place.  
The psychological incentives introduced by the gift into the investment game may 
be nontrivial. The gift could have a positive effect on the relationship if, for example, it 
represents an informal contract that binds the trustee to trustworthiness in the subsequent 
play
3; or if it is viewed as a signaling device which separates those trustees with the 
intention to share the surplus in the investment game from the rest. But there cannot be a 
separating equilibrium since the costs-and-benefits of the signal (the gift) do not vary 
between various types of trustees and hence it could be easily mimicked. It is therefore 
possible that the gift is completely uninformative about the future behavior of the trustee 
in which case it would be behaviorally neutral. Finally, it is conceivable that the gift may 
inadvertently harm the relationship by possessing a negative connotation. The gift could 
deter investment if it is interpreted as a bait or if it contributes to the trustor’s doubt about 
a positive return on his investment.  
  A somewhat similar experiment to ours has been run by Andreoni (2005) who 
examines satisfaction guaranteed that explicitly promises to refund the price to the buyer. 
In reality, not honoring satisfaction guarantee can have legal consequences for sellers, but 
suing over a small transaction can be too costly and thus this trust building contract 
device can be seen as nonbinding for some sellers. In his experimental design, Andreoni 
combines the investment game with the ultimatum game (Güth, et al. (1982)), thus giving 
the trustor an option to annul the transaction if he is not satisfied with the outcome. If 
satisfaction guaranteed is voluntary and non-binding, the trust of buyers is greatly 
reduced comparing to when it is binding. The decrease in trust is well justified as only 
17% of experimental sellers choose to honor the guarantees. The main difference 
between our study and Andreoni’s (other than a gift and satisfaction guaranteed not being 
strategically equivalent) is the fact that a gift is given before the transaction takes place, 
                                                 
3 For a more elaborate treatment of this argument see Leider and Kessler (2009). 
3 and hence there is no way to reverse the gift if the trustee defects whereas in satisfaction 
guaranteed sellers can renege if a refund is requested. 
Bracht and Feltovich (2007) study a simple precommitment mechanism in the 
investment game. Similarly to our experiment, they also add a pre-game stage during 
which the trustee has an opportunity to place some amount of money into an escrow 
account. The entire sum money from the escrow account is returned to him if the trustor 
does not invest any money or if the trustors invests and the trustee splits the surplus. 
However, if the trustor invests and trustee appropriates the surplus, the entire escrow 
amount gets forfeited, but the trustor does not receive anything. Bracht and Feltovich find 
that the efficiency of the mechanism depends on the amount that is deposited into an 
escrow account, but not so much on whether it is chosen voluntarily or imposed by the 
experimenter.  
The common feature of satisfaction guaranteed and escrow account is that they 
both enhance “trust” when they are enforceable. Thus, the punishment mechanism drives 
the behavior of trustors and trustees as the investment can be recouped and escrow 
forfeited. However, enforceable satisfaction guaranteed and escrow accounts are not 
always available to the transacting parties. Therefore, it is important to understand what 
other monetary mechanisms can increase trust when enforceability is not an option. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The experiment consisted of 10 sessions conducted at the University of 
Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand in 2007 and 2008.  Each session included a 
minimum of 12 subjects with a total of 206 subjects participating in the study.  Most of 
the subjects had previously participated in economics experiments, and some (but not a 
majority) had experience with an investment-game-like-scenario. Each subject only 
participated in a single session of the study. On average, a session lasted 50 minutes 
including initial instructional period and payment of subjects. Subjects earned on average 
15.66 NZD.
4  All sessions were hand run in a classroom under a single-blind social 
distance protocol. 
                                                 
4 The adult minimum wage in New Zealand at the time of the experiment was 10.25 NZD per hour (1 NZD 
= 0.6943 USD). 
4 Our experiment consists of three treatments (Baseline, Gift, and Endowment 
Control) implemented in an across subjects design. Baseline is the standard investment 
game by Berg, et al. (1995). There are two players, A and B, both endowed with $10 at 
the beginning of the game. The first mover, player A, decides on a whole dollar amount 
 to send to his counterpart player B. The amount sent is tripled by the 
experimenter. The second mover, player B, then decides how much of the tripled amount, 
 to return in whole dollar amounts to player A.
{ 10 ,..., 2 , 1 , 0 ∈ t
{} t r 3 ,..., 0 ∈
}
                                                
5 
Gift involves the investment game as described in Baseline preceded by a dictator 
game stage during which player B has a binary decision of whether to transfer his entire 
$10 endowment to player A or not.
6 In the investment game that follows, player A is still 
constrained to sending a maximum of $10 even if player B decided to transfer his 
endowment to player A.  
Endowment Control treatment is analogous to Baseline and differs only in the 
endowment given to both players: Player A starts the game with $20 and player B with 
$0. This treatment is necessary to control for possible confounding effects when we 
compare behavior between the Baseline and Gift treatments in order to see whether 
giving a gift increases amounts sent and returned. A confound can occur between these 
two treatments because giving a gift changes the payoffs of players A and B from ($10, 
$10) to ($20, $0). It is therefore possible, that any changes in amounts sent by players A 
and returned players B are due to this endowment effect rather than a pure effect of 
giving the gift.  
The subjects in each session were randomly assigned to be either player A or 
player B and randomly matched into pairs.  The procedures for this allocation were as 
follows.  The classroom used for the experiment was segmented in half such that the 
group of desks corresponding to a given type was located on the same half of the room.  
The desks for each type were arranged in rows facing opposite walls such that subjects of 
opposing types could not see each other while making decisions during the experiment.  
At the beginning of each session, subjects were free to choose any desk upon entering the 
 
5 The behavior of player A and player B can be interpreted as proxies for trusting and trustworthy behavior 
(Charness et al. (2008)). 
6 The decision of player B is binary for two reasons: (i) It makes mimicking of trustworthy types simple 
and (ii) it makes it easy to design a treatment controlling for the amount of money possessed by the two 
players when making their respective decisions. 
5 classroom.  The allocation of types to the two different groups of subjects was done by 
publicly flipping a coin.  The experimenter then randomly assigned a member from each 
group to create individual and anonymous type A and B pairings. 
All instructions were projected on an overhead screen and read aloud.  Subjects 
were encouraged to privately ask any questions they may have throughout the 
experiment.  In the Gift treatment, the investment game and general procedures were 
explained first. Only then did the experimenters announce that before the described game 
is played, player B has an opportunity to send their endowment to their counterpart player 
A. Upon completion of the instructional phase of for this dictator game stage, players B 
made their decisions of whether to transfer their endowment or not to their counterpart on 
provided decision sheets, which were afterwards collected by the experimenters. The 
decision of players B was written by the experimenter on their counterpart players’ A 
investment game decision sheet in the following form: 
 
Player B has transferred $____ to you before the start of the game.  This 
amount is yours to keep and will be added to your earnings. 
 
Given this information, Players A were asked to answer a question of why they believed 
that their counterpart player B transferred or did not transfer their $10 endowment to 
them.  It was made clear to subjects that their answer to this question would be private 
information and not shared with their counterparts.  This completed the dictator game 
phase of the Gift treatment. 
  The following investment game procedures were the same for all treatments.   
Players A wrote on their private decision sheet of how much money they wanted to 
transfer to their counterpart player B, which was constrained to [$0, $10]. Players’ A 
decision sheets were collected, the amount transferred was tripled by the experimenter 
and written on their counterpart player’s B decision sheet, and then all decision sheets 
were returned to the subjects.  Now knowing how much their counterpart transferred to 
them, players B decided how much of that tripled amount they wanted to transfer back to 
their counterpart player A and how much to keep for themselves. The experimenters then 
collected all decision sheets, wrote players’ B decision on their counterpart players’ A 
decision sheet, and returned the decision sheets to all players to reveal their earnings. 
6 Lastly, subjects completed a short survey on the experiment and general demographic 
information and were privately paid their experimental earnings. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Behavior of Players A 
Subjects’ behavior from all three treatments is summarized in Table 1 and 
presented in Figures 1-3 rank ordered by the amount sent by player A. The amount sent 
by players A is represented as a blue bar and the corresponding amount returned by their 
counterpart player B as an adjacent red bar. Players A sent the lowest average amount of 
4.73 in Endowment Control, slightly higher of 5.50 in Baseline, while in Gift the average 
amount was equal to of 6.50 (7.31 if the gift was actually received and 3.75 if not). This 
difference is even more pronounced when looking at medians: While in Baseline and 
Endowment Control the median amount sent was equal to 5, in Gift it was 9.50 (10 if the 
gift was actually received and 2 if not). 
 
Table 1. Behavior of Players A 
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8  Players A are obviously better off when they receive a gift.
7 Is there clear 
evidence that a gift increases the amounts sent by players A? The 2-sided Means and 
Mann-Whitney tests presented in Table 2 break up the behavior of players A into an 
endowment effect and a gift effect. It might be somewhat surprising that players A sent 
on average less money when they were endowed with $20 than when they were endowed 
with only $10. The endowment effect, however, is not statistically significant. Similarly, 
neither Means nor Mann-Whitney tests detect a statistical significance for the amount 
sent in Gift versus Endowment Control and for the amount sent in Gift versus Baseline at 
the treatment level. So just having a chance to receive a gift or having a larger 
endowment does not change player’s A behavior. 
 
Table 2. Tests for Gift and Income Effects on the Behavior of Players A 
Data 
a  Effects Tested  Means Test
  Mann-Whitney Test
 
Gift vs. Baseline  -  0.92 (.361)  0.99 (.323) 
      
Gift vs.  
Endowment Control  -  1.53 (.131)  1.53 (.127) 
      
Gift given vs. Baseline  gift effect 
endowment effect  1.71 (.093)  1.71 (.087) 
      
Gift given vs. Endowment 
Control  gift effect  2.23 (.030)  2.03 (.043) 
      
Baseline vs.  
Endowment Control  endowment effect  0.72 (.474)  0.65 (.519) 
p-values in parentheses 
a amounts sent in the respective treatments 
 
But what happens if the gift is actually received? Twenty-six out of thirty-four 
players A who received a gift from players B sent on average 7.31 (with a median of 10), 
whereas the remaining eight who did not receive a gift sent on average only 3.75 (with a 
                                                 
7 The average earnings of players A who received a gift were equal to $16.00 while those of who did not 
received a gift were equal to $9.00. For a comparison, the earnings of players A in Baseline were $9.30. 
9 median of 2). The appropriate point of reference for a comparison is the Endowment 
Control treatment data. When we control for the endowment differences, receiving a gift 
is responsible for an increase in the amount sent by player A (p = 0.030 and 0.043, 
respectively) as reported by both Means and Mann-Whitney tests presented in row 4 of 
Table 2.  
A combination of the gift effect and an endowment effect (i.e., the comparison of 
the data when a gift was received with Baseline) is also (weakly) statistically significant 
as reported in row 3 of the same table (p = 0.093 and 0.087). Thus, we conclude that 
receiving a gift caused players A to send higher amounts in our experiment. 
 
3.2 Behavior of Players B 
In this subsection we analyze whether players B are (i) made better off by giving 
a gift; and (ii) how does giving a gift affect the amounts they return back to players A.  
Giving a gift is costly to player B as he might be forgoing $10 if player A decides 
not to send anything. In order to determine whether players B are made better off by 
giving a gift, we compare the payoffs of players B who give a gift with those who do not 
(within treatment comparison) and also with those who participate in Baseline (across 
subjects comparison). Twenty-six players B who gave a gift earned on average $18.00 
while those eight who did not made on average $19.00. This difference is not statistically 
significant according to Mann-Whitney test (p = 0.525). On the other hand, thirty-three 
players B who participated in Baseline and thus did not have an option to give a gift 
made on average $21.80. Albeit higher, this amount is not statistically significantly 
different from payoffs of players B who gave a gift according to Mann-Whitney test (p = 
0.639). Nevertheless, when comparing means, the increase in the amounts sent by players 
A was too low to offset the reduction in players’ B payoffs due to the giving a gift.
8 
To address the effect of giving a gift in the dictator stage on players’ B’ decisions 
of how much to return, we estimate the following Tobit relation between amounts sent, 
St, and a dummy, D
D, indicating whether the gift was given (D
D = 1) or not (D
D
                                                
 = 0), and 
the amounts returned, Rt: 
 
8 The difference between the average amounts sent by players A who received a gift and those in Baseline 
is equal to $1.81. So even if this amount is tripled and would be all retained by players B, they would be 
better off my keeping the $10 gift. 
10 t t
D D
t t S D D S R ε β β β α + + + + = 3 2 1 . 
The bounds for the Tobit estimation were imposed by the experimental design: 
] 3 , 0 [ t t S R ∈ .
9 
We report the results from the estimation in Table 4. The only significant variables were 
the amount sent by players A and a constant. Because of a relatively small sample and 
large variation, giving a gift does not seem to influence the behavior of players B neither 
directly ( 2) β  nor through the interaction term ( ) 3 β . 
 
Table 4: Tobit Regression Estimates for the Effect of Giving a Gift on Players’ B Behavior 
Rt  Coefficient St.  Error  t  P>|t| 
 St  1.78 0.87 2.04 .050 
D
D  -38.67 39.29  -0.98  .333 
D
DSt  3.62 4.03 0.90 .375 
Constant  -10.85 6.19  -1.75  .090 
 
  Next we turn our attention to whether the amount in possession of players B when 
making their decision of how much to return affected their behavior. Because there are 
qualitative differences in whether they had $0 ($10) because they gave (did not give) 
a gift or because they were endowed with $0 ($10) at the start of the game, we explore 
this question by comparing the amounts returned in Baseline and Endowment Control 
only. We estimate the following relation between amounts sent, St, and a dummy, D
E, 
indicating whether player B had $10 (D
E = 1) or $0 (D
E = 0) when making their decision, 
and the amounts returned, Rt: 
t t
E E
t t S D D S R ε γ γ γ δ + + + + = 3 2 1  , 
where the bounds were imposed by the experimental design in the same way as before. 
The results or the estimation are detailed in Table 5. As before, the only significant 
variables explaining the behavior of players B in Baseline and Endowment Control were 
                                                 
9 While our data can theoretically be bound from above by 3St, in the actual experiment it never happened 
in that a subject would return the full amount. In fact, the maximum ever returned was 2St thus the 
constraint was never binding. Because Stata, in which we estimated our tobit regressions, does not allow to 
specify upper or lower limits using variables, we used 30 as an upper bound.  
11 the amount sent by players A and a constant. The variation in endowments has 
marginally insignificant direct effect as reported by  2 γ . 
 
Table 5: Tobit Regression Estimates for the Endowment Effect on Players’ B Behavior 
Rt  Coefficient St.  Error  T  P>|t| 
 St  2.25 0.79 2.86 .006 
D
E  11.73  7.31 1.60 .114 
D
ESt  -0.85 0.87 -0.97 .335 




  This paper reports on an experiment that studies the effectiveness of a gift giving 
in promoting trust and building a relationship. We have nested our findings in the 
standard version of the investment game to clearly observe the directional changes. We 
observe that when controlling for the endowment differences, receiving a gift 
significantly increases the amount sent by players A in the investment game. However, 
players B are not better off by giving a gift as the increase in the amount sent is not large 
enough to offset the loss to players B. The Tobit analysis of data also shows that players 
B do not change the amount returned after they have given a gift. 
  Our finding thus suggests that giving a gift increases trust. However, our data is 
still to be interpreted with caution as it is not obvious how the size of the gift 
implemented in the experiment interacts with the decisions of both players. Our primary 
goal was not to provide an exact recommendation on how to use gifts in order to induce 
an optimal amount of trust, but rather to illustrate that a gift could be an important step in 
building a trusting relationship.  
Because it was common knowledge in the experiment that giving a gift was an 
option, not giving a gift could have had some consequences as well. Therefore, we think 
that an interesting extension of our work would be to give players B an option to send a 
gift, but not letting players A know that player B can do so. Such a design would reflect 
situations where the option is less pronounced, and it is therefore possible that a gift 
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14 You  are  a  Player  ____            ID#:____ 




This is an experiment studying decision-making. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully 
and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at 
the end of the experiment. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions with care. 
 
No Talking Allowed 
It is prohibited to communicate with other participants during the experiment. Should you have any questions 
please ask us. If you violate this rule, we shall have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. 
 
Anonymity  
Each person will be randomly matched with another person in the experiment.  No one will learn the identity of the 
person she/he is matched with.  You will be matched with the same person for the entire experiment.   
 
Types 
Each two person group will consist of two types of participants (Player A and Player B) that are assigned randomly.  
Your assigned type will be listed at the top of each task instruction sheet. 
 
The Game 
You are randomly paired with another individual. One member of your pair will be a player A and the other one 
will be player B. Find your type in the upper right corner of this sheet. You will never be able to find out the 
identity of the player you are paired with.  
 
Each player’s final dollar payout will be determined according to the process below.  The game is divided into 
stages in which players take turns making decisions.  Both player A and player B begin the game with $10.  We 
will refer to this initial $10 as each player’s endowment.  
 
Stage 1: 
At the beginning to stage 1, player A has the opportunity to transfer all, any portion, or none of his/her $10 
endowment to player B.  The amount that is not transferred is player A’s to keep.  The amount that player A 
transfers triples when it reaches player B. For example, if A transfers $10 to B, B receives $30. If A transfers $5 
to B, B receives $15. If A transfers $0 to B, B receives $0. 
 
Stage 2: 
Player B then has the opportunity to transfer all, any portion, or none of the tripled amount that was transferred 
to him/her from player A. The amount that is not transferred is player B’s to keep, and the amount transferred is 
added to player A’s final dollar payout.  
 
 
15 You  are  a  Player  B            ID#:____ 
Pre-Game Decision Sheet 
 
Player A is endowed with $10.    Player B is endowed with $10. 
 
The Game to be played NEXT: 
¾  Player A must decide how much, if any, of his/her $10 endowment he/she wants to 
transfer to player B.    
¾  Each dollar that is not transferred is player A’s to keep. 
¾  Each dollar that is transferred to Player B is multiplied by 3 by the experimenter. 
¾  Player B must then decide how much, if any, of this tripled amount they want to 
transfer back to player A and the remaining portion is theirs to keep. 
Before we play this game, Player B has the opportunity to transfer his/her $10 
endowment to player A.    
 
If player A transfers the $10, then it is added to player B’s earnings. 
If player A does not transfer the $10, then it is added to player A’s earnings. 
 
Note: If the $10 endowment is transferred by player B,  
¾  it DOES NOT increase the amount that player A has available to transfer in Stage 
1. 
¾  the $10 transferred IS NOT tripled. 
¾  Player A is guaranteed to be at least as well off as the initial starting position ($10 
endowment) regardless of both players’ transfer decisions during the game. 
 
Please complete the statements below by circling one of the amounts: 
I have decided to transfer the following to player A:    $0   or   $10 
 




16 Y o u   a r e   a   P l a y e r   A           I D # : _ _ _ _  
 
The Game: Stage 1 Decision Sheet 
 
 
Player B has transferred $____ to you before the start of the game.   
This amount is yours to keep and will be added to your earnings. 
 
Why do you believe Player B transferred or did not transfer their $10 endowment to 






The Game decision: 
You must decide how much, if any, of your $10 endowment you want to transfer to 
player B.    
 
Each dollar that is not transferred is yours to keep. 
 
Each dollar that is transferred to Player B is multiplied by 3 by the experimenter. 
 
 
Please complete the statements below.  Your decisions must be non-negative 
integers, e.g. 0, 1, 2,…, 10. 
 
 
I have decided to transfer $______ to player B. 
 
 
Therefore, I have decided to keep $______ for myself.
17 Y o u   a r e   a   P l a y e r   B             I D # : _ _ _ _  
 
The Game: Stage 2 Decision Sheet 
 
 
Player A has transferred $______ to you in Stage 1.   
The experimenter has tripled this amount, and you have received $_______. 
 






You must decide how much, if any, of the $______ you want to transfer to 
player A. 
 
Each dollar that is not transferred is yours to keep. 
Each dollar that is transferred is added to player A’s earnings. 
 





I have decided to transfer $______ to player A. 
 
 




Thank you for participating in the experiment.  While we calculate your earnings, please complete the 
following survey.  All of your responses will remain anonymous and only linked to the decisions within 
the experiment via your ID#.  Therefore, please answer as truthfully and completely as possible.   
 
1.  Were you a player A or player B?   
 


























19 General Demographic Information 
 
1.  What is your age?  __________ 
 
2.  What is your sex? (Circle one number.) 
 01  Male  02  Female 
 
3.  Which ethnic group(s) do you belong to? (Circle as many as you need, then write 
the country you are from if applicable.) 
 
01  NZ European/Pakeha  _  04  Asian 
02  NZ Maori    _    Country:  _______________  
03  Pacific Islander    _  05    Other 
  Country:  _______________   Country:  _______________  
 
4.  What is your major? (Circle one.) 
01  Accounting 
02  Economics 
03  Finance or Information Systems 
04  Education 
05  Engineering 
06  Law 
07  Biological Sciences 
08  Math, Computer Sciences, or Physical Sciences 
09  Social Sciences or History 
10  Humanities 
11  Psychology 
12  Other Fields 
 
5.  What is your class standing? (Circle one.) 
01  Undergraduate – first year  04  Honours 
02  Undergraduate – second year  05  Masters 
03  Undergraduate – third year  06  Doctoral 
 
6.  What is the highest level of education you expect to complete? (Circle one.) 
 01  Bachelor’s  degree 
 02  Honour’s  degree 
 03  Master’s  degree 
 04  Doctoral  degree 
 
20 7.  What was the highest level of education that your father (or male guardian) 
completed? (Circle one.) 
 
  01  Less than high school (Fifth Form Certificate or Sixth Form Certificate) 
  02  High school (Bursary or UE) 
  03  Vocational or trade school 
  04  College or university 
 
8.  What was the highest level of education that your mother (or female guardian) 
completed? (Circle one.) 
 
  01  Less than high school (Fifth Form Certificate or Sixth Form Certificate) 
  02  High school (Bursary or UE) 
  03  Vocational or trade school 
  04  College or university 
 
9.  What is your citizenship status in New Zealand? 
01  NZ citizen 
02  Permanent Resident 
03  Refuge 
04  Other 
 
10.  Are you a foreign student on a Student Visa? 
01  Yes 
02  No 
 
11.  Are you currently … 
01  Single and never married? 
02  Married? 
03  Separated, divorced or widowed? 
 
12.  On a 9-point scale, what is your current GPA if you are doing a Bachelor’s degree, 
or what was it when you did a Bachelor’s degree? This GPA should refer to all of 
your coursework, not just the current year. Please pick one: 
 
01  Between 7.01 and 9.0 GPA (A- to A+ average) 
02  Between 5.01 and 7.0 GPA (B to A- average) 
03  Between  3.01 and 5.0 GPA (C+ to B average) 
04  Between  1.01 and 3.0 GPA (C- to C+ average) 
05  Between  0 and 1.0 GPA (D- to C- average) 
06  Have not taken courses for which grades are given 
 
21 13.  How many people live in your household? Include yourself, your spouse and any 
dependents. Do not include your parents or flatmates unless you claim them as 
dependents.  ____________   
 
 
14.  Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of INCOME earned 
last year by the people in your household (as “household” is defined in question 
13). [Consider all forms of income, including salaries, tips, interest and dividend 
payments, scholarship support, student loans, parental support, social security, 
alimony, and child support, and others.] 
 
01  $15,000 or under 
02  $15,001 - $25,000 
03  $25,001 - $35,000 
04  $35,001 - $50,000 
05  $50,001 - $65,000 
06  $65,001 - $80,000 
07  $80,001 - $100,000 
08 Over  $100,000 
 
15.  Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of INCOME earned 
last year by your parents. [Consider all forms of income, including salaries, tips, 
interest and dividend payments, social security, alimony, and child support, and 
others.] 
 
01  $15,000 or under 
02  $15,001 - $25,000 
03  $25,001 - $35,000 
04  $35,001 - $50,000 
05  $50,001 - $65,000 
06  $65,001 - $80,000 
07  $80,001 - $100,000 
08  $100,001 - $120,000 
09  $120,001 - $140,000 
10  Over $140,000  
 11  Don’t  know 
  12  Known only in foreign currency 
    Write currency and amount here:  _________________  
 
16.  Do you work part-time, full-time, or neither? (Circle one.) 
 01  Part-time 
 02  Full-time 
 03  Neither 
 
17.  Before taxes, what do you get paid? (Fill in only one.) 
22 23 
  01  __________ per hour before taxes 
  02  __________ per week before taxes 
  03  __________ per month before taxes 
  04  __________ per year before taxes 
 
18.   Do you currently smoke cigarettes? (Circle one.) 
 01  No 
 02  Yes 
  If yes, approximately how much do you smoke in one day?  _______ packs  
 